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ABSTRACT 
Over the last two decades, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) have been 
under immense pressure to conduct back-to-back deployments combating terrorism. 
The speed of operations and the goal of placing the mission first has slowly changed 
the norms and behaviors, calling into question the ethics and professionalism within 
ARSOF formations. The deterioration of ethical performance has fostered an 
environment that erodes the trust that policymakers and senior leaders have placed 
in these unique elements. In this work, we identify the importance of organizational 
culture by asking two overarching questions: How does Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) organizational culture influence behavior? And why is SOF organizational culture 
important? The team utilized Edgar Schein’s framework on culture to evaluate SOF 
organizational culture from a qualitative perspective to understand the different SOF 
organizational culture levels. Then the team analyzed Civil Affairs Officers’ survey data 
to conduct quantitative analysis between organizational culture variables and how these 
may influence behavior and contribute to building trust. The thesis concluded by 
advocating for the resurgence of the basic tenets of coaching and mentoring leaders 
who would steward the legacy SOF profession now and into the future. 
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There is a present concern that ethics and professionalism within the Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) enterprise are being eroded. In July 2019, the New York Times 
reported that a U.S. SEAL platoon was sent back to the States from their deployment in 
Iraq because of allegations of sexual misconduct.1 In the same report, the Commander of 
Operations in Iraq, Maj. Gen. Eric Hill, stated that his reason for expelling the platoon was 
due to “perceived deterioration of good order and discipline.”2 In the summer of 2017, Dan 
Lamothe, a reporter for the Washington Post, broke the news of a Special Forces non-
commissioned officer who was strangled to death by members of U.S. Navy SEAL Team 
6.3 In 2012, Business Insider’s reporter Michael B. Kelley reported on a pre-dawn car crash 
that plunged a vehicle into the Niger River in Mali, killing three soldiers and the three 
prostitutes with them.4 Two of the soldiers in the tragic incident were Civil Affairs soldiers 
from 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (BDE), Special Operations (SO), stationed at Fort Bragg, 
NC., and the other soldier was a communications specialist stationed at Fort Belvoir, VA. 
Jeff Schogol, a reporter for Task and Purpose, released a story of former Green Beret Maj. 
Matthew Golsteyn, with 3rd Special Forces Group  (SFG), where he admitted during a job 
interview with the CIA to unlawfully killing a Taliban bomb maker while Golsteyn was 
deployed to Afghanistan.5  
 
1 Dave Philipps, “A Navy SEAL Platoon Is Pulled from Iraq Over Misconduct Report,” The New York 
Times, July 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/us/navy-seal-platoon-withdrawn-iraq.html. 
2 Philipps. 
3 Dan Lamothe, “Navy SEAL Convicted in Death of Green Beret Soldier Investigated for Contact with 
Victim’s Widow at Party,” The Washington Post, July 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2019/06/19/navy-seal-convicted-death-green-beret-soldier-investigated-contact-with-
victims-widow-party/. 
4 Michael B. Kelley, “Three Prostitutes Were Involved in that Fatal U.S. Army Car Crash in Mali,” 
Business Insider, July 9, 2012. https://www.businessinsider.com/three-us-commandos-and-three-
prostitutes-died-in-a-car-crash-in-mali-2012-7. 
5 Jeff Schogol, “Former Green Beret Charged with Murder Says He Killed Suspected Taliban Bomb 
Maker in an Ambush,” Task and Purpose, December 13, 2018. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/green-
beret-murder-charge.  
2 
These events point to a systemic issue occurring within the Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) formations. As a result of the perceived increase in incidents involving SOF, 
the U.S. Congress mandated a comprehensive review of professionalism and ethics 
programs for SOF, in section 1066 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019.6 The mandate highlighted areas of concern, and was designed to assess current 
approaches to improve both individual and organizational ethics within SOF.7 
Subsequently, in 2018, the Commander (CDR) of United States Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) released his memo titled Guidance on Ethics, to examine the 
underlying causes of unethical behavior.8 The decline of ethical behavior had seemingly 
grown to a point that forced SOCOM to reevaluate its organization’s ethical climate. Each 
supporting command under the direction of SOCOM conducted a 90-day ethics stand down 
to focus on the importance of ethics in SOF culture. According to an August 2019 Military 
Times report, Gen. Clarke, the SOCOM CDR, upon assumption of command, highlighted 
the significance of ethics as being the guiding principle for every service member a part of 
SOCOM.9 During a January 2020 visit to Naval Postgraduate School, in Gen. Clarke’s 
engagement with students and faculty, he outlined the importance of leadership and offered 
several personal anecdotes regarding failure and success; he concluded his visit by 
encouraging leaders to trust their conscience when it comes to adhering to ethics and core 
values.10 He went on to add that his intent was for each member within SOCOM to 
understand the foundational role of ethics as SOF professionals as they face the nation’s 
irregular challenges. Amid the discussion, Gen. Clarke stressed the value for initiating the 
 
6 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act of 2019, Pub. L. 115–232—AUG. 13, 2018, 
132 STAT. 1636 (2018). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-115publ232/pdf/PLAW-
115publ232.pdf. 
7 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act. 
8 United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command 
Comprehensive Review, (MacDill Airforce Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2020), 
https://sof.news/pubs/USSOCOM-Comprehensive-Ethics-Review-Report-January-2020.pdf. 
9 Meghann Meyers, “SOCOM Boss calls for another Ethics Review SOCOM Boss calls for another 
Ethics Review,” Military Times, August 12, 2019. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/
2019/08/12/socom-boss-calls-for-another-ethics-review/. 
10 Nathan Serpico, “USSOCOM Commander Explores NPS with Emphasis on Innovation and 
Industry Partnerships,” NPS News, January 31, 2020, https://nps.edu/-/ussocom-commander-explores-nps-
with-emphasis-on-innovation-and-industry-partnerships. 
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comprehensive review of SOF culture and ethics in order to identify trends across the 
formation that influence lapses in ethical behavior. 
The SOCOM Review Team assessed in the United States Special Operations 
Command Comprehensive Review that, “a strong ethical and cultural foundation is 
essential to maintain the trust of the Joint Force, policymakers, and the American 
people.”11 The assessment also found that an ethically irresponsible and unprofessional 
force will foster an environment of mistrust between SOCOM and the American people, 
which will hinder the country’s ability to influence partners and allies positively. 
According to author Rod Powers, the values and principles of the military cannot and 
should not be violated, because it will undermine the Department of Defense Directive 
5500.7, Standards of Conduct.12 The SOCOM Review Team concluded that there is not a 
“systemic ethics problem.” Yet, the number of unethical incidents, such as those stated 
previously, reveals there may be something far more telling within culture of SOF than just 
the loss of ethics among these elite individuals. The SOCOM Review Team submitted that 
the drivers of unethical behavior of SOF was due in part to the improper use of the Special 
Operation Forces Force Generation (SOF FORGEN) cycle through a high rate of 
deployments. Also, the SOCOM Review Team’s analysis linked the overemphasis on 
mission accomplishment, neglect of training, leadership, discipline, and accountability as 
the causation that resulted in the failure of ethics, and it is this type imbalance which can 
lead to ethical misconduct.13 Although having a proper SOF FORGEN cycle is essential 
to maintaining unit effectiveness, improper utilization of SOF FORGEN should never 
override the core ethics of the organization. The SOCOM Review Team went on to 
highlight the need for the members within its organization to maintain an ethical and 
professional force to meet the security needs of the nation by emphasizing the inadequacies 
present within the development of both junior non-commissioned officer (NCO) and 
 
11 United States Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM Comprehensive Review” (Macdill 
Airforce Base, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2020), https://www.socom.mil/special-
operations-forces-culture-and-ethics-comprehensive-review-letter-to-the-force. 
12 Rod Powers, “Military Ethics and Conflict of Interest,” The Balance Careers, (blog), December 12, 
2019, https://www.thebalancecareers.com/military-ethics-and-conflicts-of-interest-3332000 
13 United States Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM Comprehensive Review,” 2020. 
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officer. Therefore, the SOCOM Review Team asserted that there is “insufficient 
development and a unbalanced approach to professional military education (PME) that 
neglects the career milestone requirements.”14 We concur with the notion that all PME 
should devote instructional time re-educating the force during each of the academic phases 
of professional development for officers and NCOs. According to one respondent, who 
was a former instructor at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School, “placing the burden of responsibility of ethics training upon military academic 
institutions may represent an unbalanced approach to solving the problem, for there is 
limited time for training new personnel within SOF individual courses, and every aspect of 
ethical development cannot be performed by the academic institution alone due to 
resources and feasibility.”15 The SOCOM comprehensive review represents a crucial step 
towards the identification of key drivers that may lead to unethical behavior. However, the 
review left out some key considerations in their assessment of SOF culture, primarily the 
importance of organizational values and internalized assumptions. To contribute to the 
ongoing discussion, this research provides recommendations based on both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis as a step to aid current and future leaders of SOF in a solution to 
the problem.  
This thesis aims to explore the role of the organizational culture on SOF behavior, 
principally by analyzing the uniqueness of SOF organizational culture as the primary driver 
of ethical issues leading to the moral breakdown among individuals and groups in SOF. 
The thesis will dissect and examine organizational culture to aid SOF leaders in 
understanding the power and influence of organizational culture and develop a strategy to 
enhance behavioral performance. The research seeks to address the following questions:  
The literature on ethics and organizational culture is widely discussed within the 
business and academic sectors.16 It is understood that culture is not a new phenomenon 
 
14 United States Special Operations Command. 
15 On June 12, 2020, the author spoke with DeAndre McDonald regarding SOF Ethics and 
Professionalism Interview Questions. 
16 Lynn S Paine, “Managing for Organizational Integrity,” Harvard Business Review 72, no. 2 (April 
1994): 106–17. 
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just discovered. Yet, it is something that can have enormous effects on how individuals 
interact with one another—understanding the essence of why culture matters allow leaders 
to consider establishing a cultural identity that outlasts their tenure as key leaders of an 
organization. The challenge for ARSOF leaders is the relatively short duration in which 
individuals are assigned to command positions. According to Army Regulation (AR) 600–
20, the average time for commanders to lead an organization is from 12–18 months, which 
makes sustaining a moral and ethical culture difficult.17 However, the reality of 
maintaining the right culture is often overlooked in the military context, and 
comprehending its influence on behavior is worth exploring. 
The occurrences listed at the beginning of this chapter suggest that something must 
be done to increase the values of military ethics within SOF. SOF’s organizational culture 
is a complex bureaucracy that is not easily understood. Still, through careful observation 
of the organizational culture, this thesis seeks to bring clarity to the idea that building a 
healthy organizational culture will enable SOF to build an environment that refuses to 
tolerate anything less than the established standard.  
A. WHY ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE MATTERS 
Organizational culture is significant and can be interpreted in multiple ways, 
depending on the context and the entities in question. As for the U.S. Army, the Army 
Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, defines culture as a “dynamic social system, 
containing the values, beliefs, behaviors, and norms of a specific group, organization, 
society or other collectivity learned, shared, internalized, and changeable by all members 
of the society.”18 The same publication defines ethics as “the evolving set of laws, values, 
and beliefs embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivates and guides the 
conduct of Army professionals bound together in common moral purpose to do the right 
 
17 Department of the Army, Army Command Policy, AR 600-20 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2014), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r600_20.pdf. 




thing for the right reason in the right way.”19 These definitions suggest that culture and 
ethics are intertwined. However, after analyzing the Comprehensive Report, it is hard to 
conclude that there is no ethical and cultural dilemma present within the enterprise. These 
definitions are in line with widely accepted definitions of culture, particularly the definition 
formulated by Richard Daft, who posited that “culture is the set of values, guiding beliefs, 
understandings, and ways of thinking that is shared by members of an organization and 
taught to new members as correct.”20 
The definitions previously stated will be utilized as foundational terms for this 
project’s research into SOF organizational culture. According to Cameron and Quinn, in 
their comprehensive analysis of prosperous fortune 500 companies, an essential element 
present in successful entities is corporate culture.21 Numerous studies have demonstrated 
that organizational culture directly affects performance and long-term effectiveness.22 
With these baseline assumptions and empirical evidence, it is then the intent of this thesis 
to explore SOF culture and ethics, especially following the current amplification of 
unethical behavior by SOF in multiple outlets. As Sinclair argues through his examination 
of organizational culture, one can find that it has an influence on individual ethics, and 
leaders are responsible for improving and establishing the culture of the organization.23 
The SOCOM Comprehensive Report assessed that there were numerous missed 
opportunities for senior leaders to engage units and personnel during their organization’s 
pre-mission training cycle, providing senior leaders the ability to assist in accurately 
assessing individual and group preparedness prior to deployment.24 However, our research 
suggests that the SOCOM report failed to highlight that the current shortcomings of ethics 
 
19 Department of the Army. 
20 Richard Daft, “Organizational Culture and Ethical Values,” in Organizational Theory and Design, 
2nd ed. (Mason, OH: South Western College Publishing, 2004), 112–27. 
21 Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based 
on the Competing Values Framework. Rev. Ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006,) 4. 
22 Cameron and Quinn, 6. 
23Amanda Sinclair, “Approaches to Organizational Culture and Ethics,” Journal of Business Ethics 12 
(January 1, 1993): 63–73, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01845788. 
24 United States Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM Comprehensive Review,” 2020, 4. 
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and professionalism are heavily influenced by the current organizational culture. For this 
reason, it is critical to show why leadership is vital to providing a vision that is consistent 
in educating the force and communicating ethics and professionalism that can then be 
utilized to diffuse a positive organizational culture. 
There is limited research on the topic of SOF ethics and culture, and the associated 
works on SOF in a cultural context only focus organizational performance and application 
of SOF in war. As an example, David Hawk’s work centered on the effects of 
organizational culture on performance and effectiveness, with emphasis on how U.S. 
Special Forces (SF) need to reshape its organizational culture to adapt to the new 
challenges of the future.25 On the other hand, Bart Kennedy’s research concentrated on 
defining SOF as a practice by understanding military ethics in a SOF context using moral 
reasoning.26 As part of the study, Kennedy examined the concepts of selection, narrative, 
and traditions and their role in ethical behavior. One of his key conclusions was to conduct 
further examination and reform of SOF culture to enhance ethical behavior across SOF.27 
This thesis aims to further the discussion on SOF ethics by researching SOF’s 
organizational culture, utilizing a framework to strengthen a collective understanding of 
the current state SOF culture.  
As such, to fully understand the effects of ethical issues, this thesis utilizes Edgar 
Schein’s work on Organizational Culture and Leadership by explicitly focusing on one 
component underneath the SOCOM umbrella, namely the United States Army Special 
Operations Forces (USASOC or ARSOF). By examining ARSOF’s organizational cultural 
factors, we seek to provide a framework to better understand the cultural DNA of SOF and 
shed light into how individuals and groups are influenced by SOF culture. The in-depth 
understanding of organizational culture gained through the utilization of this framework is 
 
25 David Hawk, “Sexy Is What You Make It: Organizational Culture and U.S. Army Special Forces” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42641. 
26 Bart Kennedy, “The Practice Of Special Operations: An Analysis of SOF Ethics” (Monterey, CA, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63991. 
27 Kennedy. 
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essential, as culture is one of the forces that shape ethical behavior in organizations.28 Also, 
according to Schein’s research, it is imperative to dissect organizational culture into the 
following layers: artifacts, espoused beliefs, and values, and basic underlying assumptions 
in assessing the true nature of any given culture. The thesis compares aspects of several 
organizations utilized in Schein’s research as case studies as a way to evaluate SOF 
organizational culture. Through Schein’s paradigm, the thesis provides an inside-out 
perspective of the culture, which may contribute to the moral and ethical dilemmas SOF 
members face.  
B. RESEARCH APPROACH 
In order to address the research questions, our team utilized both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to analyze SOF organizational culture. In order to evaluate SOF 
culture from a qualitative perspective, the research utilized Edgar Schein’s framework to 
evaluate organizational culture. Schein’s organizational culture model evaluates three 
levels of organizational culture: artifacts, espoused values, and underlying assumptions.29 
The application of Schein’s framework to our research methodologies is critical to decipher 
the basic assumptions which shape the values of the SOF organization, which in turn 
influence behavior. The interviews administered to SOF Officers enrolled in the Defense 
Analysis (DA) curriculum provided valuable insights from the various subcultures within 
SOF represented by SF Officers from 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups 
(SFG), as well as representatives from Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and CA.  
In addition to interviews, the study also utilized case studies and data from a survey 
conducted in 2017 with Civil Affairs Officers. The quantitative analysis identified the 
relationship between organizational culture variables and how these may influence 
behavior and the establishment of norms that may be inconsistent with the values and ethics 
expected of military professionals.  
 
28 Daft, “Organizational Culture and Ethical Values,” 21. 
29 Edgar H. Schein and Peter A. Schein, “Organizational Culture and Leadership,” 5th Ed., (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=4766585, 17.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
As stated, the primary goal of this research is to contribute to the ongoing 
conversation on ethics and professionalism within SOCOM, by identifying additional 
elements that may influence the ethical and moral compass of America’s most trusted 
warriors. Thus, the significance of this analysis of SOF organizational culture aids in 
developing and maintaining the force for the future. For without a morally and ethically 
resilient culture, SOF will erode from the inside out. Yes, SOF provides the Joint Force 
and policymakers with a combat-focused force that is prepared to offer solutions to any 
complex situations, but neglecting to address the root cause of ethical issues may result in 
more high-profile incidents. If the unethical events that occurred within SOF formations 
are allowed to persist unabated, the lack of morality will eventually erode the social credit 
that SOF has forged with the American people, and policymakers will be forced to act. 
Examining the depth of impact that organizational culture has on individuals and groups is 
vital for SOF leadership to construct an appropriate response to promoting an atmosphere 
that refuses to give into unethical and immoral behavior.  
Chapter I provided a brief summary of the ethical challenges facing SOF, as well 
as the main findings presented in the SOCOM review mandated by Congress, and 
established the necessity of conducting an assessment of SOF culture through a from a 
different perspective. In Chapter II, this thesis evaluates SOF culture through the 
application of Schein’s organizational culture model, utilizing information provided by 
SOF personnel during the interviews. Chapter III presents a quantitative examination of 
organizational culture variables and their potential effects on SOF professionalism. 
Chapter IV of this thesis summarizes the findings and provides recommendations to 
establish a coaching and mentorship program to inculcate an organizational culture 
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II. DISSECTING SOF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
To accurately understand SOF organizational culture, it is necessary to recognize 
which organization within SOCOM is being studied. Even though USSOCOM is a large 
organization consisting of multiple sub-organizations, the work completed herein only 
focused on USASOC. Within USASOC, there are six organizations: USAJFKSWCS, 1st 
Special Forces Command (1st SFC), 75th Ranger Regiment, and U.S. Army Special 
Operations Aviation Command (SOAR). The focus group for the thesis gathered 
information from fifteen participants from 1st SFC, which consisted of participants from 
PSYOPS (4th & 8th PSYOPS Groups), SF (1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, & 10th Special Forces 
Groups), and CA (83rd BN & 95th CA Brigade). There were fifteen interviews conducted 
that focused on the observations from each participant’s experience from their last 
organization. For a complete copy of the interview questions, see Appendix 1 SOF: Ethics 
and Professionalism Interview Questions. 
Over the past two decades, the tempo of combat has contributed to the breakdown 
of organizational culture. Angela Halvorson, a consultant for Abt Associates, and author 
of Understanding the Military: The Institution, the Culture, and the People, stated 
prolonged and continuous deployments could cause “uncertainty, confusion, fear, and 
disruption, that for many are beyond their limited coping or resiliency skills.”30 
Additionally, she specified that the limitation on coping skills had led some service 
members to violate both ethical and moral standards expected of military professionals. 
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the gruesome events of September 11, 
2001, conducted by Al Qaeda, thrust the United States into an enduring commitment that 
led to America’s longest war since Vietnam.31 By 2003, the U.S. was fully engaged in 
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operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.32 Plus, according to the 2006 Congressional 
Budget Office report, the Active Army spent millions of dollars on advertising campaigns 
for retention and recruiting to meet year-end strength numbers to keep pace with the 
requirements of the Global War of Terror (GWOT), primarily situated in the Middle 
East.33 DOD’s expectation of SOCOM at the earlier stages of GWOT has forced SOF 
leadership to shift its organizational focus. Andrew Feickert stated in Congressional Report 
that SOCOM deterred from conducting “activities designed to deter emerging threats…to 
current responsibilities of synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, and when 
directed, the employment of SOF globally.” 34Additionally, the SOCOM Comprehensive 
Review on ethics and professionalism added that new obligations upon SOF command 
structures led to an imbalance in the development of a cultural identity that emphasized the 
mission as the principle.35 The result of overemphasizing the mission, coupled with high 
operational tempo, inadvertently produced an environment ripe for ethical and moral 
misconduct to flourish.  
SOF’s drive toward tactical mission success has changed how some within SOF 
began to regard ethics and therefore spent time, energy, and resources toward increasing 
tactical effectiveness. Yet, according to Florian Emonet of the Swiss Armed Forces, writing 
in U.S. Army NCO Journal, to increase military operational effectiveness, ethics training 
must be a top priority of the force and executed at the lowest level.36 Emonet continued to 
state that the U.S. Army should avoid surface anecdotes like online training, and develop 
“a new approach… such as practical ethics education based on case studies to provide 
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additional elements of reflection.”37 In May 2020, USASOC Commanding Officer, Lt. 
Gen. Beaudette, addressed junior field grade officers attending professional military 
education (PME), and remarked that a number of ethical and moral issues present within 
SOF culture were resulting from the “lack of trust in a lot of ways,”38 which, in his opinion, 
stemmed from “two functional components: vision and energy.”39 Beaudette further stated 
that “good guidance and intent”40 may have alleviated the moral quandaries that ego 
personalities have cultivated within ARSOF formations. Ramus Hougaard and Jacqueline 
Carter authored a piece in Harvard Business Review, which cautioned leaders regarding 
the creation of ego personalities within high functioning organizations. Additionally, 
Ramus and Jacqueline stated that as egos grow, it places individuals and even groups in 
“insulated bubble(s), causing them to lose touch with their colleagues,”41 and this affects 
how people view established standards and norms. 
By addressing the change forming within the force, this thesis utilized Dr. Edgar 
Schein’s work on Organizational Culture and Leadership to analyze how SOF 
organizational culture can influence individual and group behavior. Schein’s work divides 
organizational culture into three separate sections for analysis: Artifacts, Espoused Beliefs 
and Values, and Underlying Basic Assumptions42 (see Figure 1). Schein’s study focused 
on analyzing what he referred to as the organization’s core or the behaviors that members 
use to communicate the culture of the organization amongst the group and to outsiders.43 
Comprehension of Schein’s evaluation process can enable SOF senior leaders to accurately 
 
37 Florian Emonet, “The Importance of Ethics Education in Military Training,” 3. 
38 Nate Prussian, “Army Special Operations Company Commanders Course” (class notes for lecture 
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39 Prussian. 
40 Prussian. 
41 Jacqueline Carter and Rasmus Hougaard, “Ego is the Enemy of Good Leadership,” Harvard 
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42 Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 5th ed. (Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017), 10. 
43 Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 17. 
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assess the complexity of organizational culture and develop a holistic plan of action to 
infuse throughout every level of SOCOM. 
 
Figure 1. Schein’s Culture Model44 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF CULTURE 
Identifying the complexity of culture requires leaders to understand what Dr. Schein 
defines as culture. Schein pivoted away from a more traditional definition of culture like that 
of anthropologist Edward Tylor. Tylor defined culture “as a complex whole that includes 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits.”45 Schein 
approaches the definition from an evolutionary understanding of culture, which captures how 
perceptions are formed over time and through circumstances:  
A Dynamic Definition of Culture 
 
44 @semanticwill, “Culture Matters,” Twitter, June 8, 2018, https://twitter.com/semanticwill/status/
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15 
The culture of a group can be defined as the accumulated shared learning of 
that group as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration; which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, 
feel, and behave in relation to those problems. 
This accumulated learning is a pattern or system of beliefs, values, and 
behavioral norms that come to be taken for granted as basic assumptions and 
eventually drop out of awareness.46 
 
The uniqueness of Schein’s explanation of culture provides a useful roadmap for 
analyzing the development of SOF organizational culture over the last 19 years. Additionally, 
Schein’s definition of culture is helpful when visualizing the external and internal factors 
which gave birth to modern SOF cultural norms. Lt. Gen. Beaudette, when speaking on 
leadership issues and cultural problems within SOF, stated that there is “nothing new to 
leadership,”47 suggesting that the ethical and moral issues highlighted in the media are issues 
that leaders cannot avoid. 
The Commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group (SFG), Col. Prussian, stated that 
there was a cultural and leadership problem within SOF. He pointed out that leaders were 
present and involved in the misconduct, and the tempo of combat from the last two decades 
has changed the environment of SOF and neglected to develop the whole soldier.48 The shift 
that took place in SOF is not something that can be immediately seen on the surface, such as 
artifacts, but requires an understanding of each element that constitutes the culture. 
B. ARTIFACTS  
What are the artifacts? Merriam-Webster defined artifacts as “a usually simple object 
(such as a tool or ornament) showing human workmanship or modification as distinguished 
 
46 Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 5th ed. (New Jersey: 
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from a natural object.”49 Schein defined artifacts as the visible and feelable elements such 
as “the architecture of the organization’s physical environment; cultural language; the 
technology and products, artistic creations;…its myths and stories told about the organization 
and its published list of values.” 50 Schein continued by stating that the first level of an 
organization is easily seen but rather difficult to interpret or understand.  
Furthermore, Schein explained that while consulting for Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) during the mid-1960s to early-1990s, he was exposed to the company’s 
artifacts from the omnipresent open-office architecture, to the dysfunctional meetings with 
top management, and matrix-style organization. Yet, he stated that the surface level of 
exposure did not explain the climate of the organization. And Laura Queen, blogger for 
Colloquia Partners, asserted in a blog post Artifacts: A Powerful Driver of Your 
Organization’s Culture, that organizational artifacts are the systems, protocols, standard 
operating procedures (SOP), and interfaces between colleagues that all produce the 
atmosphere or climate of an organization.51 Laura suggested that organizational artifacts are 
those elements that are realized but require active management to ensure they represent the 
values and beliefs of the organization.  
When analyzing SOF at the surface level of culture, the artifacts that may come to 
mind for individuals familiar with SOF, are the iconic statutes of President John F. Kennedy 
and Brig. Gen Yarbrough, which are situated across from the United States Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS).52 The statues are a 
representation of President Kennedy’s affinity with SOF elements during the Vietnam era. 
The Green Beret is an iconic symbol that communicates to the world the rigorous training 
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that is required to earn the coveted headgear.53 Yet, according to Schein, attempting to 
understand an organization by analyzing the artifacts is difficult because observers are unable 
to recreate the meaning of the artifacts of the group being analyzed. He argues that the main 
reason why artifacts alone are insufficient to understand culture is that what is seen by an 
outsider of the organization will inevitably be interpreted differently from an individual who 
is part of the organization under analysis who understands the meanings of the artifacts.54 
Thus, it is only by examining the values and beliefs of the organization we can begin to 
discover what Schein regarded as the cultural DNA.  
C. USASOC ARTIFACTS 
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6, Mission Command is the foundational doctrine 
that drives operations in the U.S. Army. It defines mission command as “the Army’s 
approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and 
decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.”55 When starting from the premise 
aforementioned, it follows that decision-making processes in SOF are decentralized and that 
all leaders are trusted to make decisions, particularly in small units. The interviews of this 
thesis revealed that, for the most part, this is true. SOF members first observe the concept of 
empowerment during their respective qualification courses and each validation exercise for 
SF, CA, and PSYOP. However, respondents revealed that the degree to which they were 
empowered differed drastically. According to the junior leaders, the differences of 
empowerment were principally due to leadership styles, and the responses revealed that, in 
some instances, junior leaders were dissuaded from making decisions during Pre-Mission 
Training. The implications of these responses show that if detachment/team commanders are 
not trusted to make decisions during training, they are less likely to be empowered during 
deployments across the globe. The discrepancy between the observed artifacts and doctrine 
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is problematic because one of the main reasons for SOF operators to transition from 
conventional forces (CF) to SOF, is to influence the planning and execution of operations in 
complex environments.  
The concepts of flexibility and adaptability are also vital elements of Mission 
Command, as these are critical to responding rapidly and effectively to dynamic changes in 
the operational environment.56 To gain insight into the application of these tenets in SOF, 
we asked if the organizations valued junior leaders who utilized initiative to support mission 
objectives. Similar to the question about empowerment, SOF members had divergent 
responses. The majority of respondents asserted that their organizations were highly 
decentralized and supported the detachment/team commander’s judgment as long as they 
kept the chain of command informed and maintained the ethical and moral high ground. 
Other SOF members stated that their respective organizations discouraged collaboration with 
other entities outside of the chain of command. This type of response suggests that SOF is 
not internalizing the essential elements of Mission Command, which in turn decreases an 
element’s ability to coordinate directly with Unified Action Partners (UAPs) to advance 
strategic objectives.  
Two additional artifacts selected for this research included the examination of SOF 
communication structure and interpersonal dynamics. When asked if the physical layout of 
the workspace was conducive to open communication, the interviewees suggested by their 
answers that the physical layouts are adequate for close collaboration within the organization 
and continuous exchange of ideas. According to Schein, during his assessment of DEC, he 
observed that the company’s high regard for and value to its communication structure were 
instrumental to their organizational performance.57  
The SOF team’s dynamics were assessed by asking SOF personnel whether the 
interaction in the organization was formal or informal, a question which is essential to 
evaluate what Schein categorizes as “unwritten rules,” as these are critical for new members 
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to adapt to the organization.58 In SOF, one of these unwritten rules is how personnel address 
each other on a first-name basis, when on a mission or inside the team room, which is 
different from the Conventional Force (CF) military customs and courtesy. All respondents 
stated that interactions at the team level are informal, which at times can lead to confusion 
for younger team members. 
This thesis also looked at two critical processes that influence and shape behavior in 
an organization: reward systems and punishment. To assess reward systems, we asked two 
closely related questions: What are the organization’s rewards systems, and how often is 
ethical behavior recognized? Although a limited number of organizations followed their 
award policies, the majority of respondents stated that SOF members do not receive rewards 
comparable to their efforts and performance. Overwhelmingly, the respondents agreed that 
the organizations did not prioritize reward systems, as a result of the high OPTEMPO of 
operations or inefficiency in established administrative systems. 
An interesting perspective presented by a former Headquarters and Headquarters 
Company (HHC) commander was that in some organizations, the types of awards are often 
dictated by rank; thus, junior NCOs within SOF tend to receive lesser accommodations 
despite significant contributions to the organization. A common response was that 
organizations only provided awards upon the end of a Soldier’s assignment with the unit. In 
some instances, SOF members received only a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) award 
for a 3–4-year period in which he/she deployed to potentially hostile environments. However, 
some organizations demonstrated an appreciation of soldiers by informally recognizing 
individuals in front of the organization. An additional response was that SOF members were 
expected to perform at a high level and that the reward for their efforts was the yearly 
evaluation process. The majority of respondents answered that ethical behavior is not usually 
rewarded in organizations in any formal way, because it is a part of the evaluation process, a 
process which evaluates the character and professionalism of the soldier.59 One SOF 
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member responded that the reward for ethical behavior was inherent in the assignment to 
additional positions within USASOC.  
The responses to the question of the utilization of punishment for unethical behavior 
are somewhat concerning. Generally, the agreement is that SOF does not consistently hold 
individuals accountable for their actions. Some observed that investigations occur when an 
incident is highlighted by external reports, which casts a negative light on SOF. Otherwise, 
members are reassigned around to other organizations within SOF, with little to no 
consequences at the individual level. Alternatively, SOF members are reassigned to CF units, 
or as one respondent stated, “when they are not good enough for the professionals, they send 
you to minor leagues.”  
D. ESPOUSED VALUES AND BELIEFS 
When identifying the espoused values and beliefs of an organization can be difficult 
because these are elements that require observation. However, Schein defined organizational 
or corporate espoused values and beliefs as those principles, ideals, ideologies, and 
aspirations that originate from an individual’s system of beliefs and values.60 Schein 
highlighted that “espoused beliefs and morals or ethical rules remain conscious and serve as 
the normative or moral function for guiding members to deal with certain situations.”61 
Kanika Khandelwal and Nishtha Mohendra, while researching organizational values defined 
espoused values as “values that are expressed on behalf of the organization or attributed to 
an organization by its senior managers in public statements, may be distinct from practiced 
values.” 62 Therefore, the principles and values of an organization become the driving force 
that moves organizations toward success or failure. 
Building the correct culture requires significant investment, which takes time and 
commitment. Schein, in his analysis of Ciba-Geigy, a Swiss multinational, multidivisional, 
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and geographically decentralized company, stated that the company placed a premium on 
how the value of “elegance and quality, was reflective in the interactions amongst its 
members and its development of its products and services to consumers.63 In addition to the 
value mentioned in Ciba-Geigy, there was a high value placed on respect for technical 
expertise, academic achievements, individual efforts, and contribution. However, the 
essential aspect that underpinned the success of the company came as a result of the 
company’s global identity of helping “third-world countries” tackle complex problems. The 
value of other people became a vital part of the company’s DNA, a value that was 
communicated to new members.  
For example, the fast-food company Chick-fil-A places a significant value on care, 
and they communicate this principle in how they care for the needs of each customer.64 
Additionally, to show that they are serious about the value of caring for its members, the 
company is closed on Sundays to allow time for the organization and employees to rest. 
However, Patrick Lencioni, author of The Five Dysfunctions of Team, wrote in Harvard 
Business Review that a hallowed set of values would hold no meaning, which leaves the 
organization vulnerable to highly destructive behaviors.65 He continued by stating that, even 
though corporations have great values posted, it does not make them immune to possessing 
a toxic culture. To drive his point home, Patrick presented how the Enron Corporation failed 
to uphold its list of corporate values: “communication, respect, integrity, and excellence.” 
Patrick’s assessment revealed how Enron’s failure in leadership nurtured an environment 
ripe for corruption that led to the company’s bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, Enron’s story is not anything unique. The internet is full of stories of 
organizations that are disastrous for many different reasons. Schein stated there are 
“organizations that espoused values and beliefs that reflect desired behavior but are not 
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reflected in observed behavior.”66 Understanding that some organizations have dichotomous 
thinking, it is essential to identify how SOF organizational culture espoused values and 
beliefs influence their cultural norms.  
Within a relatively short period, SOF has seen a transition from being known as quiet 
professionals into a force that has lost its way. They worked behind the shadows influencing 
the Nation’s foreign policy objectives, to what the SOCOM Comprehensive Review referred 
to as a culture focused on force employment. This subtle transformation in culture is what 
Schein explained as the dynamic change of beliefs and values.67 The variation of responses 
regarding values revealed what Schein referenced as a contradiction in what the organization 
says and what it does.68 David Hawk, in his work, asked the crucial questions, such as “does 
SOF organizational culture hinder or promote the adherence to SOF ethics and 
professionalism?”69 However, Jonathan Kingsley, a SOF operator researching Special 
Forces values stated the following:  
Aspects of culture that are part of indoctrination include developing a shared 
identity, assumptions, meanings, values, mindsets, perceptions, ideology, and 
norms. Individual Green Berets come to understand what their peers and the 
organization expects of them. Here they begin to experience normative 
pressures, including competition in marksmanship and physical training. A 
message in SF education is, ‘It pays to be a winner.’ The “winner is 
rewarded.70 
The SOCOM Comprehensive Review highlighted the fallacy in creating a culture 
that defines winning in terms of physical and tactical fitness above ethical and moral 
correctness in conduct.71 It is not to claim that physical strength and combat skills are not 
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essential, but as Hawk stated, “if the organizational culture is one that places a premium on 
cultural awareness,”72 the culture should reflect that in its actions as well. However, in the 
context of SOF, thinking that the mission takes precedence over other elements of the 
organization can lead to assumptive thinking that creates unexpected cultural norms. 
E. USASOC ESPOUSED VALUES 
The foundation of the Army profession is rooted on the Army Values: Loyalty, Duty, 
Respect, Self-less Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage (LDRSHIP), which along 
with the standards of our profession assist Soldiers with maintaining a moral compass to 
fulfill our commitment with the American citizens.73 The Special Operations Command 
adds to the Army Values, through the incorporation of a set of norms and values intended to 
influence SOF capabilities and behavior, the SOF Truths. These include: “Humans are more 
important than hardware,” “quality is better than quantity,” “Special Operations Forces 
cannot be mass-produced,” “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after 
emergencies occur,” and “Most special operations require non-SOF support”74 Thus, to 
continue our assessment into the behaviors and processes that can be observed, but difficult 
to interpret, it is necessary to evaluate the values and norms propagated by USASOC. During 
the interviews, we asked the participants to delineate the values of the organization. Although 
the majority in one way or another alluded to the Army Values and the SOF Truths, we 
obtained different responses, which suggest that the USASOC culture as a whole is not 
synchronized.  
One respondent stated that the values for him meant “getting things done.” Other 
respondents stated integrity, honesty, and SOF truths as the main drivers of their performance 
and behavior. However, some respondents noted the importance of providing clarity to 
subordinates to prevent misinterpretation of the values. Special Operation members added 
competence, innovation, creativity, adaptability, teamwork, perseverance, and 
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empowerment to the values of their respective organizations. Perhaps, the most concerning 
answers regarding loyalty were expressed by two respondents who stated that commitment 
within the teams was so strong that it led them to look the other way when it came to behavior 
that may be categorized as unethical or immoral.  
After the identification of the values espoused across the subcultures that make up 
USASOC, the next logical step was to evaluate the diffusion of the values across the 
organizations. We do have to make a clear distinction at this point, and that is that the 
respondents were all officers. Therefore, in our current setting, we are unable to evaluate the 
Non-Commissioned Officers’ (NCOs) assessment or the lower enlisted in support functions, 
both of which form the core of our organizations. Because of leadership differences, we 
obtained a variety of insightful responses, which included amplification of the values through 
meetings, memorandum for records, command philosophies, symbols such as beret flashes, 
t-shirts, and posters across the organizations. Some of the units used museums in their 
installations, museums which highlighted the values and norms presented in their respective 
creeds. The respondents asserted that most of the values were adopted directly from the 
ARSOF vision and the organization’s mission statements.  
In principle, all the approaches, as mentioned earlier to diffuse organizational values, 
represent positive steps taken to establish a professional culture. However, as clearly 
articulated by one of the respondents, “the values on the posters mean nothing until they are 
given some meaning by leadership.” This statement is critical because out of the seven 
organizations interviewed, only three of them devoted time during the counseling process, 
briefings, or actions that demonstrated the importance of the organizational values. Perhaps 
the best example was one organization that legitimately exemplified the “human is more 
important than hardware” principle by continuously taking care of the SOF member families 
in times of need.  
Once we gained insight into the espoused values within USASOC and how they are 
diffused across the organizations, the following discussions focused on each SOF member’s 
interpretation of organizational culture. The first question asked whether organizational 
culture was a key component in the success of the organization. Not surprisingly, each of the 
SOF members answered positively to this question. However, two important observations 
25 
came to light: leadership engagement, and deployment cycles, both of which negatively 
impacted organizational performance. In the first instance, the emphasis on leadership 
engagement diverged significantly between organizations. Some respondents stated that their 
senior leaders took the time to counsel and mentor subordinates, but in general, responses 
indicate senior leaders did not prioritize engagements with junior officers.  
The FORGEN cycle was identified as the second obstacle to an effective 
organizational culture. The respondents described how the fast OPTEMPO limits their ability 
to interact with senior members of the organization, and as a result, they receive little to no 
guidance from leadership, which leaves them left to their own devices to identify the values, 
the mission, and vision of the organization. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that the lack 
of leadership engagement, continuous deployment cycles, and rapid turnover of leadership 
is perhaps one of the main drivers influencing unethical behavior. These assertions seem to 
validate the findings of the SOCOM review. Essentially, the high demand for SOF elements 
from the TSOCs represents an obstacle for command teams to assess the character of the 
individuals deployed.  
Another key organizational aspect assessed was whether there was a fit between the 
individuals in the organization and its culture, with an emphasis on character traits. The 
responses were mostly in line with previous assessments, in that organizations value 
innovative personnel and those that can execute missions to standards. Others stated that 
physical fitness, initiative, competence, and desire were important in assuming higher risks, 
and these were the key traits sought by their organizations; they also were essential to 
building trust and confidence. Although the traits already mentioned are critical, character, 
or ethical behavior, in general, were each not mentioned. One of the respondents with recent 
experience in a conventional Army organization stated that the “difference between SOF and 
big Army is that SOF checks the box on character traits, but the conventional Army 
emphasizes character traits as thoroughly as possible.”  
These assessments suggest that organizations are confident that the SOF selection 
processes at SWCS have screened candidates with character traits that will be a good fit for 
SOF units. Therefore, the organization is less likely to emphasize ethics and values upon new 
members’ arrival to the organization. Of particular concern is the observation from multiple 
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SOF members that there is little to no ethics training upon arrival to the unit, as part of the 
PMT, or while deployed. The officers interviewed further stated that the NCOs and lower 
enlisted receive even less ethics training, and this may represent a gap that negatively 
influences SOF members’ behavior, and hence in a violation of the trust emplaced in us by 
the American people.  
F. TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED UNDERLYING BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
To identify what drives individuals and groups within an organizational culture to 
perform and behave in a particular manner requires a comprehension of basic or tacit 
underlying assumptions. Edgar defined basic assumptions as elements that the group 
“learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.”75 By 2004, the 
New York Times reported that with the destruction of the Taliban in Afghanistan and defeat 
of Iraqi dictator Hussein and his Republican Guard, the problem of terrorism began rapidly 
expanding across the globe. At that time, the only force capable of shouldering the burden of 
responsibility for conducting counter-terrorism operations was USSOCOM.76 It is in this 
context that SOF plunged into three underlying assumptions: the concept of mission first, 
and leadership influence, and adherence to core Army Values.  
G. THE MISSION FIRST 
During the first part of the GWOT, the mission first mantra of SOF came into being 
out of demand to target violent extremist organizations from areas in the Middle East to the 
shores of Southeast Asia. In 2010, according to a U.S. Senate report, SOF received increased 
funding to prevent state and non-state actors from “destabilizing countries, creating 
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economic crisis and causing violence” amongst key areas of the U.S. interests.77 In an effort 
to secure success in the global strategy against terrorism, SOF became fixated on tactical 
activities related to Direct Action as the primary measure of achievement. In 2012, David 
Oakley and Patrick Proctor wrote an article in the Journal of Strategic Security highlighting 
how the fallacy of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy, inadvertently led to DOD’s infatuation 
with killing or capturing enemy combatants and subsequently developing a culture focused 
on mission success.78 Oakley and Proctor stated that the “zero-sum game strategy created an 
imbalance”79 in American military strategy during this period. In some ways, the zero-sum 
strategy cultivated a culture where a generation of SOF leaders fostered a climate absorbed 
with accomplishing the mission. Schein suggested that those leaders were unconsciously 
“selecting and educating colleagues as well as subordinates” 80 to think like them. At the 
height of GWOT, of the twelve Special Operations Core Activities, three of four activities 
were geared toward achieving those results.81 During the period of executed missions 
centered on counter violent extremist organizations (C-VEOs) took place on a global scale, 
where soldiers, junior NCOs, and junior officers were being developed in a hyper-mission 
focused environment. Schein exclaimed, what we devote care to, we become.82 Without the 
time to stop and assess the organizational core values, the next generation of leaders will not 
be able to lead the organization forward.  
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H. LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE 
The current operational environment is complex, and many junior level SOF leaders 
are tasked with navigating through its ambiguity at times, with little to no guidance. 
However, when the time comes for junior leaders to seek assistance for a problem, the 
response from some leaders has been, “there is nothing new to leadership.”83 Schein 
explained that when leaders respond with a lack of understanding, it forces new and even 
seasoned leaders to seek “defense mechanisms” to cope with uncertainty.84 Kenneth 
Williams authored an article, Toxic Culture, to highlight how DOD enables toxic 
environments to exist. Williams stated that when subordinate leaders are fearful of being 
labeled as incompetent, they will begin developing their path toward a solution that leaves 
some superiors, “assuming the organization is healthy.” 85 However, when leaders become 
disillusioned with their actions, it can lead others to begin disregarding the values of the 
organization, thus creating an alternate culture.  
I. ADHERENCE TO CORE ARMY VALUES 
When asked, do the values of the organization transfer to all areas of life? More than 
half of the participants interviewed responded with a resounding, yes! If the answer is yes, 
the values of the organization do transfer to other areas of life. Why, then, was a senior NCO 
assigned to 7th SFG caught attempting to smuggle drugs from Columbia to the United 
States?86 These incidents may indicate an issue that some leaders are not willing to admit, 
and that is that some leaders stop holding individual soldiers accountable to Army standards 
but instead due established cultural norms. If such norms are reflective of the organization’s 
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values, then the question must be asked, what does the organization value if leaders are 
caught engaging in destructive behaviors? If an organization values benchmarks, such as 
physical fitness, the ability to shoot, move, communicate, and medicate, then members as a 
part of the organization pride themselves in improving those skills based on what the 
leadership values. Schein suggested that when it is “assumed that everyone is highly 
motivated and competent, leaders act under those assumptions”87; they refuse to investigate 
to see if their personnel are modeling the Army Values.  
The examination of SOF culture is complex, not an easy task to undergo, and not the 
most desirable thing to do if you are a member of the same culture. Organizations always 
assess if the product that they are bringing to the consumer is of the best quality and price. 
Nevertheless, with the same understanding of free-market principles, it is imperative for 
leaders to conduct an honest self-assessment of SOF formations to ensure that at every turn, 
SOF is providing the consumer (taxpayers) the best personnel to guard and protect the United 
States’ most prized asset: its freedom.  
J. USASOC BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
As we look at the third layer of organizational culture, with a theoretical 
understanding of what it signifies, it is time to examine those organizational values that are 
deeply engraved in SOF culture. To shed some light on this, we began by asking participants, 
what is the way of doing things in the organization when faced with time constraints and 
limited guidance? Generally, most respondents answered the question by attributing 
adaptability and competence as the main values, critical to the success of their operations. 
Overall, the expectation is for SOF members to “figure it out on their own” because it is 
taken for granted that all SOF members were precisely selected to make decisions under 
pressure. These responses suggest that these values are indeed part of the “cultural DNA” of 
SOF. Other responses included the assessment from the SOCOM review that mission comes 
first no matter what, and family comes second. A narrative that mission comes first raises 
some concerns, considering the value that some organizations claimed they place on 
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supporting families and home life stability, which are critical to success in the battlefield—
therein suggesting a misfit between the values advertised with what is observed in the 
organization.  
Another interesting response was that SOF personnel are told to “go forth and do 
great things,” with limited guidance from senior officers. Another respondent stated in his 
answer that that little guidance and operating under pressure is part of the “SOF SOP.” These 
responses suggest an underlying assumption that SOF members are comfortable operating in 
uncertain environments, that they will apply their training and judgment to complex 
problems sets, and uphold the values that define their profession, including the Army values 
and the SOF Truths. Thus, SOF members are trusted by their higher echelons to reflect these 
values in their daily operations.  
Given the responses provided by the respondents, we sought clarification regarding 
their statements to understand the phrase “get the job done” within their respective 
organizations. The most common interpretation was that SOF teams must be able to complete 
the mission by any means necessary as long as the approach was not unethical, immoral, or 
against the law. The issue with “get the job done,” according to the respondents, is that the 
unethical is not clear enough—leaving some SOF members room to develop their own 
interpretation; this can result in personnel engaging in behavior that is contrary to 
organizational values. One of the interviewees compared the “get the job done” with the 
concept of “grey zone” operations. He stated that both are ambiguous and that the latter one 
is continuously engraved in SOF operators beginning at the SOF assessment and selection 
processes. In his perspective, both concepts represent a slippery-slope scenario in which the 
misinterpretation of these, along with the lack of leadership oversight and unclear mission 
and vision statements, puts SOF members in a position in which unethical behaviors are more 
likely, due to the pressure of completing a mission. Another taken for granted assumption of 
the phrase “get it done” meant different things such as, don’t bring embarrassment to our 
organization, and make sure that the unit as a whole gets credit for your efforts through 
recognition from U.S. agencies and multinational partners.  
According to observations provided by participants of this research, loyalty is an 
espoused value deeply engraved in SOF members. However, loyalty from the team to the 
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mission was cited as a value that is represented by SOF personnel. However, loyalty to the 
team appears also to have negative effects on SOF culture and professionalism. There is a 
notion that SOF teams take care of each other, to the point of covering up unethical or, in 
some cases, illegal acts for the benefit of the team. Among the examples described are drug 
offenses, DUIs, and adultery, which often resulted in no punishment for the individual. In 
some instances, as described previously, lapses in professionalism are amplified across the 
community, and multiple media outlets are addressed simply by moving the person to other 
units. In some instances, those who accrued enough time for retirement are kept around until 
they are able to conclude their service in the Army. As explained by SOF members, the 
problem with this deep sense of loyalty is that junior leaders and lower enlisted members are 
often aware of these incidents, and the net effect is that the kind of behavior that contradicts 
our values is permeated across the organization.  
To summarize our discussion of what Schein refers to as the essence of organizational 
culture or the taken-for-granted assumptions, the SOF members’ depiction of their 
organizational culture suggests that the organizational values are not congruent with 
observed behavior in SOF culture. An experienced operator articulates the most compelling 
argument for this. He exclaimed that our force “built itself on the Army Values,” which are 
complemented by the SOF truths, which in turn led to the assumption that these values are 
so deeply engraved in SOF personnel that it is not necessary to emphasize them anymore. It 
is expected for SOF members to live by these values and self-adjudicate when they see any 
deviation from them by SOF personnel. This expectation is also reinforced by the yearly 
evaluation process in which soldiers are evaluated by their character attributes. However, 
based on the answers collated for this thesis, the insufficient leadership engagement, lack of 
emphasis on organizational values, and inadequate training may be hindering the 
internalization of the values which drive our profession.  
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III. A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION OF TRUST AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE VARIABLES ON SOF 
PROFESSIONALISM  
The confidence of the American people in the profession of arms occupies a special 
place in our society, as demonstrated by the latest Gallup poll conducted in 2019, which 
shows a 79% confidence in the military.88 Another reputable source, the World Value 
Survey (WVS), captured similar results with an 81% confidence in the armed forces.89 
These are surprising results, considering the increased levels of political and social 
polarization experienced in our nation. Special Operation Forces (SOF) are a key 
component of our National Security Strategy (NSS). Special operations are highly relied 
upon to achieve national security objectives. The overutilization of SOF, characterized by 
continuous deployments across the globe to conduct missions that range from combating 
terrorism to stability operations, have led to organizational culture challenges that have 
brought the professionalism of SOF into question.  
Several isolated incidents, highly amplified through numerous communication 
outlets in a politically charged environment led to a congressional mandate to evaluate 
factors that may be contributing to the perceived increase in unethical behavior across SOF. 
This mandate, outlined in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), led to 
the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) comprehensive ethics review.90 Although the 
findings are extremely helpful to address the issue at hand, the researchers decided to 
evaluate specific aspects of organizational culture from a quantitative perspective by 
assessing the effects of multiple variables on the levels of trust, and how these affect ethical 
behavior. In order to add to the ongoing discussion of SOF professionalism and ethics, we 
will begin with a literature review to first define trust, articulate its importance in 
 
88 “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/Confidence-
Institutions.aspx. 
89 World Values Survey, “Confidence: Armed Forces” World Values Survey Association, 2017, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp. 
90 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act of 2019, Pub. L. 115–232—AUG. 13, 2018, 
132 STAT. 1636, §. 1066 (2018). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-115publ232/pdf/PLAW-
115publ232.pdf.  
34 
organizational culture, and then discuss the research design and findings of this thesis. Even 
though some of the hypotheses are not fully supported by the results, the findings illuminate 
specific aspects within SOF that must be addressed to retain the high levels of trust 
conferred by the American citizens.  
A. WHAT IS TRUST? 
When leaders are faced with circumstances that erode and decrease the value of 
trust in their organization, they must ask the most leading question: what is trust? Merriam-
Webster defines trust as the “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of 
someone or something.”91 In a study discussed in Trust in Leadership, Dirks and Ferrin 
stressed the importance of trust between leaders and followers by encouraging superiors to 
model forth the type of character that promotes trust through “behaviors and attitudes.”92 
In 2003, two researchers, Dr. Barbra Adams, and Dr. Robert Webb, conducted research to 
locate related theories regarding the significant role that trust plays in small military 
teams.93 Their research presented findings extrapolated from interactions with small 
teams, which sought to enlighten the minds of military leaders and future researchers by 
focusing on the research gap concerning trust within smaller constructs of the military. 
They further displayed the diversity of thought on this topic by suggesting that trust was 
“both a psychological state and behavior.”94 Their findings assisted us to plan and conduct 
a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of trust in organizational culture and how it relates 
to SOF’s ethical dilemma. The research presented in this work analyzes the role of trust as 
a critical element to building and maintaining an organizational culture that preserves the 
ethics and moral integrity in SOF.  
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST 
SOF is not unique in confronting issues of professionalism. However, due to the 
complexity and multiplicity of SOF’s organization and mission sets, trust is held in high 
regard amongst its members. Trust is seen as an essential component for unit effectiveness, 
and it promotes organizational values and unit cohesiveness for the express purpose of 
accomplishing the commander’s intent.95 In 1999, Dirks addressed the effects of 
interpersonal trust in organizational settings and argued that effective communication is linked 
to levels of trust. He further posited that trust is a key element for cooperation and hence 
enhanced work performance.96 His study provided a baseline for examining the role that 
communication has in building trust in SOF’s cultural identity. 
Leaders looking to create trust within an organization must be willing to actively 
develop a framework that influences the behavior of each member of the organization. 
According to U.S. Army senior enlisted personnel writing in NCO Journal, the U.S. Army’s 
core values are a sure means to establishing an environment of trust.97 They went on to state 
that the U.S. Army encourages and expects its members to live and uphold the following 
tenets: “leadership,” “duty,” “respect,” “selfless service,” “honor,” “integrity,” and “personal 
courage” (LDRSHIP). The U.S. Army, and to some degree, the other branches of the military, 
consider that adopting creeds such as LDRSHIP defines the military profession and shape any 
organization’s understanding and value of trust.98 
Stewarding trust is a heavy burden but an important one to bear. Army Doctrinal 
Publication (ADP) 1–1 states that, “trust is the foundation of our relationship with the 
American people, who rely on the Army to ethically, effectively, and efficiently serve the 
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Nation.”99 The same level of trust is found at the root of every SOF element, from a two-man 
Marine Special Operations (MARSOC) sniper detachment to an Air Force Special Operations 
(AFSOC) 9-man AC-130W Stinger crew. Trust is regarded as a structural component of SOF, 
and for every service component that is a part of SOCOM, trust is expected to permeate from 
the individual throughout the whole. This is not to assume that this is not a present thought 
within each element within SOCOM. However, as researchers we must continue to address 
the importance of trust as being the unique cornerstone within the SOF enterprise. 
Nevertheless, Holmberg et. al. claim that there is a shift taking place that is adversely 
impacting the trust that leaders have placed in SOCOM and its elements. Their findings 
suggest that to develop an environment of trust, there must be attention given to creating ethics 
training that is geared toward instilling the core value of trust within every member of the 
organization. They further claim that trust builds upon communication, respect, and external 
rewards in the organization. Adams and Webb stated that the focus of trust is “both an 
individual level and a higher organizational level” value.100 Understanding this dynamic is 
essential to identifying and solving the ethical dilemma within SOF.  
Trust is vital to any organization, especially with respect to SOF members’ ethical 
performance. Dirks, in his research, focused on trust and group performance, and stated that, 
“high levels of trust can increase the degree of performance from members in a group 
setting.”101 Yet, even today, there remains an information gap surrounding the understanding 
of trust in the SOF team environment and how it influences every aspect of the organization. 
It is important to note that examining trust in small military teams provides an understanding 
for individuals outside or unfamiliar with the construct of SOF the enterprise.  
When defining trust within the organizational culture, it needs to be understood that 
there are two distinct categories of trust in organizations: personal-based trust, and category-
based trust. Personal-based trust is established through regular interactions at the work place, 
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and thus is dependent on time spent with team members.102 According to Adams, category-
based trust comes from the assumptions team members internalize based on belonging to 
specific groups. Personal-based trust is inherently challenging, due to the rapid turnover in 
leadership and op-tempo of operations. Category-based trust in SOF comes from individuals 
being selected to become part of the community and the completion of specific qualification 
courses. The establishment of the aforementioned levels of trust is critical for the commitment 
of the team members to the organization’s mission, vision, and values, and hence influences 
the behavior of personnel.103 Lyons, Stokes, and Schneider highlighted in Predictors and 
Outcomes of Trust in Teams, the importance of trust development and ongoing interactions to 
build team cohesion, which in turn increases work performance and reveals that trust in teams 
is a critical enabler to organizational success.104 It is critical to understand the importance and 
the impact of trust, because of its role in predicting future behavior, as articulated by Tuan 
who posited that “ trust is conditioned upon how well the trustor can understand and predict 
the trustee’s actions”.105Many leaders understand that without trust, an organization will fail 
at the start, and that trust is as an absolute to effectiveness and key to communication and 
respect. 
C. HOW DOES TRUST IMPACT SOF CULTURE  
In this section, we concentrated our research on the significance of trust and 
organizational culture using data and analysis. However, before explaining our study, we 
reviewed works by other researchers and academics to demonstrate what broken trust can do 
to the culture of an organization. Dr. Barbara Adams and Dr. Robert Webb explore trust in a 
military context in their work, Trust in Small Military Teams. Their research suggests that, 
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“the nature of trust, and the factors affecting trust” influence the way in which individuals in 
organizations function in absence or violation of trust within a team environment.106 They 
further emphasize that trust assumes how individuals will communicate and show respect in 
a future setting where trust is cultivated through practices and interactions with others.107 
Trust is essential in understanding the other influencers as it relates to culture, for with it we 
can explain the dynamics of organizational culture from its subcultures to micro-organizations 
and the influence it wields on members of a group. 
Other academics such as Dirks and Ferrin examined the role of trust from an 
organizational perspective by providing a framework to enhance researchers’ ability to 
analyze the consequences of trust by explaining the positive results of trust.108  
When trust is broken, it is assumed that it is some intrinsic thing that does not affect 
the whole of an organization. Mark Hall describes trust in his work as having “both intrinsic 
and instrumental value.”109 Hall continues by advocating that trust is an essential 
characteristic that “affects aspects of ethics, law, and public policy,” ultimately causing 
undulation throughout an organization.110 Hall suggested that when trust is eroded, it could 
eventually lead to tearing down of pre-established norms, values, and ideas which were 
created to maintain good order and discipline. Hall’s theory is especially pertinent within 
SOCOM; the recent ethics review stated there are discrepancies throughout several areas of 
SOF, which pose an internal threat to the SOF enterprise.111 As an organization, SOCOM is 
a multi-disciplinary command that relies on interdependency to achieve strategic effects for 
senior leaders. As a result of the interconnectedness of the organization, new behaviors and 
norms are quickly adopted before leaders can identify the cultural changes occurring in their 
organizations.  
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After analyzing SOCOM’s ethics review and several other studies regarding SOF’s 
ethical issues, our team posited that the low levels of trust influenced the perceived erosion of 
individual and group ethics and professionalism. However, the SOCOM ethics review team 
identified force employment as the principal element causing the unethical domino effect 
across the force.112 Gen. Richard Clarke, Commander of USSOCOM, was quoted in an 
article by columnist Luiz Martinez of ABC News, stating that, “recent incidents… threatens 
the trust”113 built between SOCOM and the American population. Martinez further highlights 
Gen Clarke’s idea that strengthening morals represents an essential step towards improving 
SOF organizational culture, and thus maintaining high levels of professionalism within the 
ranks.  
Nevertheless, the SOCOM review would have leaders believe that the frequency of 
deployments created the “cascading effects” across the force.114 However, our research has 
not led to the identification of quantitative data that supports the SOCOM Review Team’s 
findings and recommendations. Yet, Ferrin advocated that the absence of trust creates an 
environment that leads to more leaders and subordinates neglecting service values, in favor 
of a system of norms that focuses on internal benefits instead of the team or organizational 
goals.115 According to the Human Resources for Health Journal, the presence of character 
inconsistencies can give way to behaviors that destabilize individual and group motivation, 
deteriorate overall work performance, and decrease trust relationships that influence 
adherence to organizational norms and values.116 
 
112  United States Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command 
Comprehensive Review. 6. 
113 Luiz Martinez, “Special Operations Command Orders Comprehensive Ethics Review Following 
Recent Scandals,” ABC News, August 12, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/special-operations-
command-orders-comprehensive-ethics-review-recent/story?id=64928932. 
114  USSOCOM Review, 7  
115 Joseph Lyons, Charlene Stokes, and Tamera Schneider, “Predictors and Outcomes of Trust in 
Teams,” 2018, 35, https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315549637-3. 
116 Dickson R. O. Okello and Lucy Gilson, “Exploring the Influence of Trust Relationships on 
Motivation in the Health Sector: A Systematic Review,” Human Resources for Health 13, no. 1 (2015): 17, 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12960-015-0007-5. 
40 
D. DATA AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on SOCOM’s findings, the team decided to analyze the effects of trust in 
organizational culture to understand the problem in depth and add to the ongoing discussion 
of ethics and professionalism in SOF. The team utilized Kristen Aubele’s research regarding 
junior officer recruitment and retention within the active army, titled A Look at the Human 
Capital in Army Special Operations Civil Affairs.117 Her work focused on taking a holistic 
view of the retention dilemma happening within Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), 
Civil Affairs. Aubele’s research focused on assessing the attitudes and concerns which 
influenced the decisions of mid- to senior-level O-3/Captains on active duty to either remain 
in the organization or transition from active duty service. Kristen, with approval by the 95th 
(SO) (CA), Civil Affairs Branch Proponent, and the United States Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC), surveyed the CA Captain population assigned to the two CA active 
duty Brigades: the 95th CA (A), 85th CA, as well as officers assigned to staff positions in 
support of Conventional Forces (CF) organizations. It is also important to point out that the 
respondents had different levels of experience, years of service, and deployments, and this is 
critical to consider when performing quantitative analysis. The survey questions were 
administered through the SurveyMonkey cloud-based software.  
This data represents the best available source to address one of the primary questions 
of the team’s research examining how individuals are influenced by organizational culture. It 
is suitable to the research, because CA is a subculture within SOCOM, and the data provides 
an unadulterated preview into understanding the some of the dynamics affecting trust and 
ethical behavior in SOF entities. Due to the inherent similarities between SOF elements, 
which include PSYOP, SF, NAVY SEALS, MARSOC and ARSOC, and CA, this data assists 
the team with the illumination of organizational culture issues permeating throughout 
SOCOM after almost two decades of persistent engagements. The total number of 
respondents utilized for the analysis consisted of 152 CA officers. The questions asked during 
the survey included assessments on levels of communication, trust, intrinsic and extrinsic 
reward systems, organizational values, and professionalism among other factors.  
 
117 Aubele Kristen, “A Look at the Human Capital in Army Special Operations’ Civil Affairs” 
(master’s thesis, West Virginia, University of Charleston, 2017). 
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The team thoroughly examined the raw data from the CA survey to select and evaluate 
factors pertinent to our hypotheses, as the survey measured several elements which are critical 
in assessing organizational culture, particularly when it comes to trust and behavior. The 
selection of variables was guided by the literature review with emphasis on seminal 
publications on organizational trust and its effects on work performance and behavior.118 
Utilizing the most relevant empirical analyses and research, along with the findings of the 
SOCOM comprehensive review and the SF Survey, the research team derived the following 
hypotheses:  
(1) H1: Effective communication, and implementation of extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards systems enhance trust in SOF entities. 
(2) H2: Organizations that undervalue the factors of professionalism, diffusion of 
values, duty, and trust are less likely to exhibit ethical behavior.  
The unit of analysis utilized for the research are the survey respondents (N=152).  
E. METHODS 
The research team selected trust, defined in the CA survey as “faith in personnel,” as 
the dependent variable for the analysis of H1. The independent variables chosen to evaluate 
the outcome on trust were communication, extrinsic rewards, intrinsic rewards, and respect. 
The factors of leader and deployment were selected as control variables for this study, because 
each has the potential to influence the independent variables. The time in the position as a 
team leader, as well as the distinction between a deployed environment or garrison affects the 
way in which officers assess the variables analyzed in this study. For H2, the team utilized 
professionalism, values, intrinsic rewards, extrinsic rewards, accountability and trust as 
independent variables to measure the effects on ethical behavior, the dependent variable for 
H2. The survey question that best described the dependent variable asked whether the CA 
force as a whole demonstrated honest and ethical behavior. As far as the control variables, the 
same factors were utilized for H2: leader and deployment. The rationale behind the selection 
 
118 Dirks and Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” 18–23; Dirks, “The Effects of 
Interpersonal Trust on Work Group Performance,” 2–20; and Adams and Webb, “Trust Development in 
Small Teams,” 3–31. 
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of these variables is the robust empirical support for these in the research conducted by 
influential scholars in the field of trust. The recent SF survey, a qualitative analysis which 
evaluated the sentiment of SF Captains, also influenced the team’s hypotheses and selection 
of variables. The examination of these two hypotheses provided insight into how individuals 
are influenced by organizational culture, and thus contribute to the ongoing strategic level 
conversation of SOF ethics and professionalism.  
The data utilized for this study was not initially conducive to conduct quantitative 
research, since the questions were asked using a five-category scale. In order to make the data 
suitable for analysis the team created dichotomous values/dummy variables (0,1), using R 
software. This procedure was conducted for all the factors considered in this research. After 
the values were converted to binary values, the team conducted exploratory analysis to 
observe potential relationships between the DV and IVs.  
After reading the data set in R, and ensuring that it was suitable for analysis, the 
research team conducted logistic regressions for both hypotheses. For each hypothesis, the 
team started the analysis with base variables, and proceeded with a stepwise approach to 
measure the effects of additional factors on the dependent variable. In H1, the team tested for 
multiplicative interaction between two variables: job satisfaction and communication; this 
was in order to test whether the effect of one independent variable is affected by another.  
Following the logit regressions on multiple models, the team utilized the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) scores to determine the model with the lowest predictive error, 
and, thus, those that more accurately predict the effects of the variables examined on the 
dependent variable. Lastly, the models with the lowest AIC scores were utilized to conduct 
additional visualizations to evaluate substantive effects and, thus, the robustness of the 
findings.  
F. MAIN RESULTS: HYPOTHESIS #1 
Table 1 presents the results of the main logit models tested for H1. The first four 
models, (m2, m3, m6 and m8), represent the baseline models in which the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable were first tested. Additional models were 
tested; however, these were excluded from the table due to lower AIC scores. As we can see, 
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each of the four IVs appears to have a significant effect on the DV, when no other factors are 
controlled for in the model. The next four models, (m10, m15, m16, and m17), delineate 
specifications in which the main IVs were added sequentially to account for the effects that 
each of these may have on the DV. An interesting finding in these models is that 
communication, job satisfaction, respect, and extrinsic rewards appear to influence the 
outcome of trust, suggesting support for hypothesis one. In each of these models, an increase 
in the IV results in a corresponding increase of the dependent variable, with standard errors 
estimated between 95% to 99% confidence in the direction of the coefficient. 
Table 1. Logit regression results of the effects of IVs and CVs on trust 
 
 
However, as we evaluate the last three models in Table 1, (m18-40), we observe 
that the significance of communication is diminished when job satisfaction is inserted in 
the model, indicated as weakly statistically significant in m39 and non-significant in m40. 
 
 Dependent variable:   
 Trust 
 (m2) (m3) (m6) (m8) (m10) (m15) (m16) (m17) (m18) (m39) (m40)  
Communication  2.795***   2.230** 2.217** 2.300** 2.283**  1.971* 16.332 
  (1.062)   (1.072) (1.072) (1.075) (1.075)  (1.090) (1,035.881)             
Job Satisfaction         0.940** 0.860* 0.955** 
         (0.429) (0.440) (0.450)             
Respect 2.163*** 1.909***   1.848*** 1.848*** 1.830*** 1.830*** 1.828*** 1.675*** 1.650*** 
 (0.386) (0.398)   (0.411) (0.411) (0.413) (0.413) (0.420) (0.427) (0.427)             
Ext Rewards   2.284***  1.652** 1.639** 1.592** 1.583** 1.597** 1.224 1.252* 
   (0.643)  (0.732) (0.731) (0.733) (0.732) (0.717) (0.756) (0.758)             
Accountability    1.585***        
    (0.416)                    
Leader      0.066  0.029 -0.076 -0.067 -0.070 
      (0.384)  (0.388) (0.404) (0.413) (0.414)             
Jobsat * Comm           -15.187 
           (1,035.882)             
Deployment       0.493 0.488 0.242 0.376 0.391 
       (0.569) (0.572) (0.606) (0.603) (0.603)             
Constant -1.485*** -1.548*** -0.387** -0.521*** -1.658*** -1.690*** -1.710*** -1.723*** -1.784*** -1.778*** -1.797*** 
 (0.320) (0.326) (0.175) (0.197) (0.342) (0.393) (0.350) (0.397) (0.406) (0.406) (0.408)              
Observations 160 160 159 149 158 157 158 157 145 145 145 
Log Likelihood -91.788 -84.954 -100.673 -94.845 -81.219 -81.188 -80.842 -80.821 -77.126 -74.675 -73.907 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 187.576 175.907 205.346 193.689 170.439 172.375 171.684 173.642 166.252 163.350 163.814  
Note: m= model                                                                                                                                                                                                                  *p<0.10**<0.05 p***p<0.01 
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In m18, the effects of job satisfaction, respect, and extrinsic rewards were evaluated, and 
all indicate support to H1, in the absence of a control for communication.  
The initial results indicated that the variable of job satisfaction, which accounts for 
intrinsic rewards systems, reduced the statistical significance of communication in the 
organization. To evaluate potential interaction between these two variables, the researchers 
controlled for collinearity as shown in m4; however, the interaction was not statistically 
significant.  
The AIC scores reported in Table 1 indicate that model 39 is the most accurate to 
predict the outcome of the DV, with a score of 163.350 and across 145 respondents. In this 
model, the positive coefficients for both communication and job satisfaction suggest an 
effect on trust. However, both variables are weakly statistically significant with a p < .10. 
The second most preferred model is m40, with a score of 163.814. The difference between 
these two models is that m40 accounts for the interaction between job satisfaction and 
communication. The third model with lowest AIC score is m18, with a score of 166.52, 
with the same amount of observations as the previous two models. These findings suggest 
that the CVs of leader and deployment have limited to no effect on the outcome of trust.  
Taken together, the logit regression analyses conducted to test H1 suggest partial 
support for our hypothesis. An interesting finding during the analysis presented in Figure 
2 is the substantive effect of the variable of respect on trust among all the models tested. 
In all models evaluated, the positive coefficient of respect was statistically significant, with 
a p < 0.01. An additional visualization that illustrates the robustness of the findings is 
included in Figure 3, which is a coefficient plot that denotes the prediction of the effects 
on DV with a 95% confidence interval.  
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Figure 2. Substantive effects of respect on trust 
Figure 3. Robustness checks of variables analyzed across 5 logit regression 
models 
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G. MAIN RESULTS: HYPOTHESIS #2
Table 2 reports the findings from the main models. As discussed, a stepwise
regression was utilized for H2 as well, but the base models are not presented in the table. 
Instead, the table shows the results of combined model specifications. In model 27, the 
team controlled for the effects of organizational values, trust and job satisfaction, all with 
a positive coefficient suggesting an effect on the DV with at least a 95% confidence 
interval. In model 29, the researchers controlled for values, trust, and professionalism. The 
results showed a weakly statistically significant effects of organizational values on the DV. 
It also demonstrated a positive effect of trust and professionalism on the DV with p <.05. 
However, the effects of both trust and professionalism were not significant when the 
subsequent models controlled for job satisfaction. Model 31 suggests a positive effect of 
values and respect, but the variable of professionalism does not appear to influence the 
outcome of the DV. 
The next five models, (m34-38), evaluated the effects of job satisfaction, 
accountability, respect, values, and control variables on ethical behavior and represent the 
primary focus of the analysis on hypothesis #2. The AIC scores suggest that the most 
accurate model that predicts the effects of the IVs on ethical behavior is model 34, with a 
score of 142.8. As we can see, organizational values, job satisfaction, respect, and 
accountability all have positive coefficients that influence the outcome of ethical behavior, 
with p < .05 for values and p < .01 for job satisfaction, respect and accountability, 
respectively. Model 34 is similar to models 37 and 38, with the distinction that it does not 
control for leader and deployment, and the control variables, which do not appear to have 
a statistically significant effect on the outcome.  
Based on the models with the lowest AIC scores, Figure 4 suggests partial support 
for hypothesis 2. The diffusion of organizational values, respect, job satisfaction, and 
accountability appear to influence the perception of ethical behavior in the organization. 
The suggested influence of these four factors on the dependent variables are also displayed 
in Figure 5, in which we assessed the robustness of the findings.  
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Figure 4. Substantive effects of IVs from model 34 on ethical behavior 
 




The effects of trust in organizational settings have been extensively researched, and 
it is widely understood that trust within organizational culture is essential, as Roderick 
Kramer wrote in Annual Review of Psychology, “trust has a number of important benefits 
for organizations and their members.”119 This account is largely undisputed, but the effects 
of trust on performance and behavior are exerted in two distinctive ways. First, there is a 
large body of literature which claims that trust exerts a direct effect on the outcome of 
desirable factors for organizational performance. However, the seminal empirical analysis 
conducted by Dirks and Ferrin (2001) suggests that, although the first account has some 
merits, trust also plays an indirect role as a moderator of desirable outcomes related to 
organizational performance. More specifically, their findings suggest that trust is essential 
in influencing team members’ attitude and behavior.120 More importantly, the authors 
suggest that trust can be utilized to predict future behaviors. This rationale is precisely what 
led the authors of this thesis to evaluate the effects of trust in organizational culture as a 
key element influencing performance and, more importantly, ethical behavior as posited in 
hypothesis #2.  
Although the effects of communication on trust appear to be weakly statistically 
significant in the preferred model of our research, it is critical that SOF emphasizes the 
importance of this factor in the team dynamics. Empirical analyses on the effects of 
communication in organizational settings strongly suggests that communication influences 
the level of trust in an organization, which is critical for cooperation across the 
organization.121 Communication is also categorized as a key element of organizational 
trust in the military, along with competency and caring for team members.122 In the SOF 
 
119 Roderick M. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust In Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring 
Questions,” Annual Review of Psychology 50, no. 1 (1999): 565, https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.psych.50.1.569. 
120 Kurt T. Dirks and Donald L. Ferrin, “The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings,” Organization 
Science, Vol 12, no. 4, (Jul-Aug 2001): 465, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3085982?seq=1. 
121 Kurt T. Dirks, “The Effects of Interpersonal Trust on Work Group Performance,” Journal of 
Applied Psychology, Vol 84, no. 3 (1999): 447. 
122 Philip Gift, “The Three C’s of Trust,” The Military Leader (blog), June 19, 2016, 2, 
https://www.themilitaryleader.com/three-components-trust/. 
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context, one-on-one interactions can be extremely challenging when compared to the 
private sector, because SOF teams are often geographically dispersed. The leadership of 
these teams are also inserted into the organizations shortly prior to deployment, and this 
further hinders the establishment of the levels of trust necessary to achieve optimal 
performance and behavior. As alluded to in the SOCOM review, as one of the main 
findings there needs to be a more concerted effort of leadership engagement to 
communicate more effectively with subordinates. The renewed effort of leadership 
engagement and open communication across the organization is essential to enhance the 
levels of trust in SOF entities.  
The concept of intrinsic rewards, measured as job satisfaction in this research, was 
selected for its suggested influence on trust.123 It makes intuitive sense that job satisfaction 
was weakly statistically significant, when measured together with communication, respect 
and extrinsic rewards, because SOF members are selected for their adaptability to their 
respective environments and support operations from the tactical to the strategic levels. 
This is generally true, because even without communication, SOF members are motivated 
to determine a way forward through coordination and planning with Partner Nation (PN), 
Interagency, and other SOF elements. According to Thomas, what might be suggested with 
these findings is due to the presence of four intrinsic rewards: sense of choice, competence, 
meaningfulness, and progress. Taken together these four elements might increase the 
commitment to the assigned tasks, and when empowered by leadership may increase trust 
in the organization.124  
Although the coefficient of extrinsic rewards was not statistically significant in the 
preferred model, in accordance with AIC scores, it was statistically significant in every 
other model tested, and thus warrants attentions in future studies of the influence of trust 
in SOF. Ferrin and Dirks suggest that rewards have a statistically significant effect on 
interpersonal trust, and can be utilized to increase the levels of perceived trust and hence 
performance and behavior in the organization. In SOF, extrinsic rewards can take several 
 
123 Adams and Webb, “Trust Development in Small Teams,” 2003. 
124 Wayne Thomas, Intrinsic Motivation at Work : Building Energy & Commitment, 1st ed. (San 
Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2000), 43. 
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forms, ranging from nomination to civilian schooling, specialized training, awards, other 
recognitions, or promotion. It is important to recognize, however, that the sentiments 
outlined in at least two surveys indicate that SOF organizations are not necessarily 
prioritizing reward systems, perhaps due to the high rate of deployment or operations. 
According to Gift, reward systems are critical to demonstrate to SOF members that the 
organization cares about them, their contributions to the mission, and their self-
development.125  
The effect of respect was significant across all models tested in both hypotheses. 
According to Okello and Gilson, respect is one of the key motivational factors that 
influences the level of trust in organizations.126 In the SOF community, it is imperative 
that organizations respect individuals, based on their capabilities assessed during the 
selection process. Individuals undergo a rigorous process in which aptitudes related to 
behavior, competency, and moral values are thoroughly screened for. As mentioned before, 
organizations quickly deploy individuals to lead small teams, teams that do not have proper 
time to make their own assessments. Thus, it is not surprising that respect between 
leadership and subordinates is highly regarded when it comes to the perception of trust in 
SOF.  
As previously noted, the organizational values appear to influence ethical behavior. 
The diffusion of values defined as basic assumptions on how team members ought to 
behave are essential for a positive organizational culture, because along with beliefs, they 
are the foundation for “shared understandings” across the organization.127 The recent SF 
survey, which captured sentiments related talent management and retention of SF Officers, 
suggests a disconnect between the organizational values and observed values.128 
Preliminary findings in our own research indicate that the values are not diffused equally 
 
125 Gift, “The Three C’s of Trust,” 3. 
126 Okello and Gilson, 17. 
127 Vijay Sathe, “Implications of Corporate Culture: A Manager’s Guide to Action,” Organizational 
Dynamics 12, no. 2 (1983): 7, https://doi.org/10.1016/0090-2616(83)90030-X. 
128 Daniel Warner et al., “The Future of U.S. Army Special Forces Talent Management” (Boulder, 
Colorado: University of Colorado, 2019), 10. 
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across the SOF formations. The negative effects of the lack of discussion or diffusion of 
values according to Sathe are that when team members are not reminded of values 
consistently, these values are ignored and not internalized by team members. If this occurs 
in an organization, it is conceivable that subgroups abide by a different set of values, which 
may then affect the behavior of individuals. In essence, the scenario may represent a 
deviation from organizational culture or misfit between the expected behavior with the 
actual behavior of teams.129  
Along with the diffusion of values in an organization, it is imperative to establish 
and implement measures of accountability of personnel who deviate from established 
values and norms. In this study, the concept of punishment measured with the variable of 
accountability suggests that it may have a regulatory effect on behavior. Thus, it is 
imperative to evaluate the organizational systems in place to monitor and address undesired 
behavior. Daft argues that accountability must be part of the organizational system, which 
needs to specifically outline the adverse effects of unethical behavior in their rules and 
policies to prevent the diffusion of undesirable behavior.130  
I. CONCLUSION 
The recommendations from the SOCOM ethics review are crucial in addressing 
factors within SOF culture that may be influencing the behavior of individuals. Even 
though the review did not find systemic issues in SOF culture, it is imperative to evaluate 
the organizational variables influencing the culture, especially trust, as it is the “bedrock 
of our profession.” according to GEN (RET) Dempsey.131 The quantitative study, which 
was conducted on a subculture of SOF, suggests that the systems and processes that account 
for communication, external rewards, and accountability affect the levels of trust needed 
to enhance cohesion in the organization. Furthermore, the data suggest a critical role of the 
diffusion of values and norms and their effects on ethical behavior. Taken together, these 
observations indicate that SOF entities must place additional emphasis in discussing and 
 
129 Sathe, “Implications of Corporate Culture: A Manager’s Guide to Action,” 15. 
130 Daft, “Organizational Culture and Ethical Values,” 121. 
131 Department of the Army, The Army Profession, 3–1. 
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diffusing the values, that perhaps due to the rapid op-tempo of operations, are not 
internalized by the organizations. The risks of ignoring the importance of the 
aforementioned factors is that this neglect may lead to amplification of norms adopted by 
sub groups that are counterproductive to SOF culture, and thus perpetuate unethical 
behavior. More importantly, the lack of internalization of the right values erodes the 
external trust with the American people.  
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
The genesis of our research stemmed from our desire as members of the SOF 
community to contribute to the ongoing discussion on SOF ethics and professionalism. We 
began with two key questions: Why is organizational culture important? And how are 
individuals influenced by SOF organizational culture? To address these essential questions, 
we examined them within the SOF community context from both a qualitative and 
quantitative methodological approach. The intent of this approach is to uncover and 
illuminate additional factors that may be influencing SOF ethics and professionalism that 
were not identified during the SOCOM’s Comprehensive Review on ethics. In this way, 
the conclusions reached through these dual lenses can be understood as a needed expansion 
of the conclusions reached in the Comprehensive Review. To the best of our knowledge, 
our research is unique in the utilization and combination of two distinct approaches to 
evaluate SOF organizational culture. Chapter IV, first summarizes the main findings of our 
research, identify trends found in both the qualitative and quantitative analyses, and 
conclude with a proposed way forward.  
We first selected the Schein model as the framework for the qualitative examination 
of this thesis because, compared to other models, it provides the strongest and most holistic 
view of organizational culture. The framework dissects organizational culture into three 
distinct levels, with the ultimate goal of identifying what is truly internalized by members 
of an organization. As discussed in Chapter 2, the first level of Schein’s framework are 
artifacts, or what members can observe upon arrival to the organization. The interviews of 
our study revealed that, in general, the concept of empowerment is widely emphasized in 
theory, but it is applied at different levels across the organization. The divergence in the 
application of this concept is of concern, since most of the members of the organization 
switched from CF to SOF primarily to influence operations at the operational and strategic 
levels in complex environments.  
56 
While examining the organization variables that shape and influence behavior and 
performance revealed areas of improvement for SOF. In the first instance, respondents 
assessed that rewards system were not utilized as advertised in policy letters posted across 
the workspace. The main reasons for this provided during the interviews was the high 
OPTEMPO and multiple missions, both of which resulted in the low prioritization of 
rewards. The common perception is that senior leaders obtain rewards that aided in their 
career progression, whereas for junior members, the same type of rewards are won for 
outstanding performance. The second aspect uncovered during interviews was the 
adjudication of punishment for ethical or immoral infractions, and that some members in 
the community received protection from punishment due to their prior accomplishments 
and time in SOF.  
The second element of analysis, the espoused values, suggested that the Army and 
SOF Values are exhibited around the physical spaces of the organization. However, there 
is little to no emphasis placed to ensure that team members understand the espoused values. 
One of the most consistent observations was that senior leaders did not prioritize 
engagement with subordinates to discuss organizational values or ethics in general. 
Furthermore, rather than supporting individuals with strong character traits in accordance 
with Army values, organizations placed more emphasis on innovation and capabilities to 
“get the mission done.” Based on conversations with SOF members and our own 
experiences, it appears that the organizational values promoted across the force are not 
resonating with the individuals, and thus are not internalized.  
While analyzing interviews to examine USASOC basic assumptions, we 
discovered that, among 80% of the participants previously serving within the 1st SFC, there 
was an inconsistency in responses. However, when asked about the values of their last 
organization, all interviewees stated that “the mission” was the most critical value. The 
mission-first culture cultivated by the organization detracted from maintaining the health 
of the organization and its members. SOF at the organizational level became performance-
oriented, and over time overlooked leaders and individuals who lacked the personal 
character required for SOF. Furthermore, there is a widely held belief that because each 
individual undergoes a thorough selection process, which considers character traits as one 
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of the main determinants of professionalism, all members, when confronted with complex 
challenges, will exhibit ethical behavior. This assumption is deleterious on SOF culture, 
and potentially even dangerous, as it diminishes the importance of organizational values 
during the planning and execution of worldwide missions. The risk to SOF organizations 
over time is the potential misinterpretation of the values, as discussed with regard to 
loyalty, for example. At the current juncture, it is apparent that creating the culture for the 
future requires a paradigm shift in how SOF develops current and future members. 
B. TRENDS OBSERVED BETWEEN QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
The first hypothesis tested during the quantitative analysis was that effective 
communication, respect, and implementation of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards systems 
enhance trust in SOF entities. The results suggest that, indeed, all these variables except 
extrinsic rewards significantly influence the levels of trust in the surveyed population. As 
we have seen, due to the OPTEMPO and emphasis on “mission first,” combined with the 
idea that SOF can operate with limited guidance, the communication between higher 
echelons and teams is less than ideal. Concerning reward systems, we obtained different 
results. On the one hand, respondents highlighted issues with the reward systems during 
interviews. Still, the survey answers suggest that extrinsic rewards are not that critical, 
comparatively and overall, when it comes to influencing levels of trust in the organization.  
During the examination of the second hypothesis, the evidence posited that 
organizations that undervalue the factors of professionalism, diffusion of values, duty, and 
trust are less likely to exhibit ethical behavior required of its members. In this case, the 
diffusion of values, levels of job satisfaction, and punishment were all significant elements 
that influenced ethical behavior. The findings with regard to the diffusion of organizational 
values support the responses captured during the interviews, thus enhancing the validity of 
the assessment that additional emphasis in the way that we communicate SOF values to 
current and future members. Another trend found in common between both research 
approaches was the significance of punishment as a method to ensure that SOF personnel 
adhere to the organization’s values and regulations. Taken together, when it comes to 
accountability for ethical shortcomings or moral failings, it appears that the lack of 
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enforcement by leadership is a significant contributor to unethical behavior. Over time, the 
absence of consequences reinforces and normalizes unethical behavior, a situation which 
may lead to some of the incidents highlighted in social media. 
C. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE 
With the understanding of how the dynamics of SOF organizational culture wields 
influence on individuals and groups, it’s essential to develop a path for fostering the type 
of culture that is both ethical and professional. In 1989, Stephen Covey, a renowned author 
and leadership guru, identified a problem with the understanding of personal ethics during 
his research on the habits of successful people. He stated that, while analyzing “success 
literature published in the U.S. since 1776,”132 there were two competing ideas regarding 
success. Covey suggested that the literature written within the last 50 years was nothing 
more than what he calls “personality ethic.” Personality ethic is described as artificial 
remedies that focus on the outward image, such as attitudes and behaviors. Personality 
ethics lack the depth required to cultivate an organizational culture that can withstand the 
attacks against moral and ethical judgment. At the beginning of the thesis, we highlighted 
several different ethical and professional infractions that are a direct result of personality 
ethics.  
On the other hand, Covey describes literature composed during the Nation’s 
formative years as works that are more attentive to the formation of what he terms as 
“Character ethic.” Character ethic, as Covey stated, is “the foundation of success,” the 
foundation which by nature requires the development of an individual’s core beliefs. In 
essence, Covey said that the character ethic deals with “things like integrity, humility, 
fidelity, temperance, courage, justice, patience, industry, simplicity, modesty, and the 
Golden Rule.” Character ethic represents a core value system that is not swayed by outward 
pressures and temptations. Character ethic is developed over time and is revealed when 
one’s core beliefs are reflective in behavior and performance. This is in contrast to 
personality ethic, much like the current concept of SOF Attributes, which only demonstrate 
 
132 Stephen Covey, 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change (NY: 
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59 
temporal displays of professionalism and moral courage. The problem repeatedly 
communicated in the news media is a result of SOF organizational culture’s acceptance of 
the duplicitous nature of personality ethic over concrete aspects character ethic. 
D. MOVING PAST A SOF ATTRIBUTES BASED ORGANIZATION TO A 
SOF PRINCIPLES-BASED ORGANIZATION 
The current SOF values paradigm has eight leadership traits known as the SOF 
Attributes: integrity, courage, perseverance, personal responsibility, professionalism, 
adaptability, the ability to be a team player, and capability. However, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with expecting individuals and leaders within SOF to display these 
attributes. The problem is, as the evidence presented in this thesis attests, that the display 
of these attributes cannot produce the type of members that SOF needs to succeed. The 
current attributes-based approach has neglected to develop the whole SOF soldier. 
According to Army Doctrine Publication 6–22, Army Leadership and The Profession, 
“Army Values consist of the principles, standards, and qualities essential for service.” SOF 
Attributes are only worthwhile if they become embodied as principles within the 
organization and its members.  
However, the only way to achieve that goal is through a novel concept: mentorship. 
Mentorship is not, of course, a new concept within the Army. According to Army doctrine 
FM 6-22, mentorship is defined as “the voluntary developmental relationship that exists 
between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is 
characterized by mutual trust and respect.” Mentorship, as a voluntary program, continues 
to provide space and opportunity for the same behavior to exist. The concept of mentorship 
must take on a new approach if SOF, as an organization, expects to see members abandoned 
surface displays of behavioral modifications to adopting a principled-focused culture. 
E. TRANSGENERATIONAL COACHING AND MENTORSHIP 
Transgenerational coaching and mentorship (TCM) is a concept of coaching and 
mentoring, coupled with the idea of building an organization geared toward leaving a 
legacy. TCM is a program that focuses on engaging all members within SOF organizational 
culture by making existing members responsible for the process of defusing SOF Attributes 
60 
as principles. As members at every level embody the principles, the climate of the 
organization begins to shift toward reproducing the cultural environment that refuses to 
accept any individual that violates the new norms of the organization. To create the 
organizational culture that is ready to tackle any challenge requires a concept that 
transcends military generational boundaries. The transgenerational process is a deliberate 
effort of effectively passing the organization’s legacy to each generation.  
As SOF transitions its focus on leaving a legacy for the next generations, it creates 
a sense of ownership within the culture. When current and future members see themselves 
as owners of a legacy, they work to restore and maintain trust with senior leaders and the 
American people. TCM aims to build an organization that consciously thinks about 
becoming successful stewards of the SOF profession. The stewardship of the profession is 
a vital responsibility that must be protected. Through transgenerational mentorship, 
communicating SOF values become an essential priority of the organization. A principle-
oriented organization builds principled leaders who are empowered to engage and to lead 
from their character, while propagating the core identity of SOF. Transgenerational 
mentorship is bringing into being an environment that develops individuals to operate both 
ethically and professionally as Quiet Professionals. 
F. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Even though this thesis provided some important insights into SOF organizational 
culture, we encourage researchers and leaders to take what is provided herein to examine 
the whole of USSOCOM, not merely SOF. One approach in this examination could be the 
expansion of both the qualitative and quantitative research to include larger populations, 
including NCOs and lower ranked enlisted personnel. Although the interviews were 
conducted with representatives from three SOF branches, they were limited to discussions 
with officers and warrant officers. Similarly, the quantitative portion of our research 
considered only the sentiments from commissioned officers. An additional 
recommendation would be to formulate a survey in conjunction with the interview 
questions used in our research to ensure that the data from the same population is analyzed 
from both perspectives. It would be interesting and fruitful to compare and contrast our 
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findings with future research to assess the effects of the implementation of measures 
suggested by the comprehensive review.  
Furthermore, it could also be worthwhile to compare different sub-group 
populations sets against one another within the broader USSOCOM organization, such as 
compare our finding here for SOF with those of similar research on NSW, for example. 
That is, additional research utilizing the frameworks used in this research could shed light 
as to whether these findings are unique to USASOC, or if they apply across USSOCOM. 
U.S. Army SOF is the largest contingent within USSOCOM, meaning that SOF culture 
may have received much of its influence from USASOC. Several questions need to be 
evaluated to come to an appropriate conclusion, such as, is USASOC culture the dominant 
personality found within USSOCOM? Is USSOCOM at large experiencing the same shift 
concerning personal ethics? And, are there other services recruiting messages aimed at 
individuals with the character? 
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What approaches have been effective to transform the organizational 
culture, and which ones have not yielded the desired effects? (Artifacts) 
2. What are the values of the organization? (Espoused Values) 
3. How does the company communicate its values? (Espoused Values) 
4. Do the values of the company transfer to all areas of life? (Basic 
Assumptions) 
5. Does your company/organization believe it has the “right kind of culture?” 
(Basic Assumptions) 
6. Is the culture of the company a key component to having an effective 
organization? (Espoused Values) 
7. Does the culture of your organization speak to the character of the 
individuals you seek to recruit? (Espoused Values) 
8. Given the new generation of soldiers/employees, can your organization 
adapt to survive and thrive in a new environment? (Basic Assumptions) 
9. Does your company value individuals who go outside of the normal 
change of command to accomplish the mission/goals? (Artifacts) 
10. What is the frequency of meetings and the time spent in meetings? 
(Artifacts) 
11. Is the physical arrangement of the workspace conducive to open 
communication and exchange of ideas? (Artifacts) 
12. What are the interpersonal dynamics between members of the 
organization, do members address each other formally or informally? 
(Artifacts) 
13. What is your organization’s “way of doing things” when faced with time 
constraints and little to no guidance? (Basic Assumptions) 
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14. What are the organization’s reward systems? (Artifact) 
15. How often is ethical behavior rewarded in your organization? (Artifact) 
16. Are there any rituals or stories that emphasizes the role of ethical behavior 
on performance?  
17. Are team members empowered to make decisions? (Artifacts) 
18. What role do organizational values play in the evaluation process? (Basic 
Assumptions) 
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